the dismal science


 I picked up Triumph of the City, by Ed Glaeser, who’s been coming up a lot lately.  I got about halfway through it, to page 127, where I read this paragraph

There is even a statistical reality behind the passion for shoes of the urbanites in Sex and the City.  Big-city households spend 25 percent more on footwear, again relative to their total budgets, than households outside of cities, presumably because they are buying fancier shoes, although it is possible that their shoe leather is wearing out faster pounding the city pavement.  As in Sex and the City, the urban desire to present an attractive appearance also reflects the fact that big-city density serves to connect people romantically, creating a market for mates that is, in its way, as important as the labor market.

And just kind of sighed and put the book away.  It’s not just this passage; it’s most of the book.  It reads like an overgrown magazine article, full of semi-pointless anecdotes and obvious facts.  I just don’t feel that it’s groundbreaking work to talk about footwear sales, or the origin of the word “restaurant”, or the fact that Bangalore is hopping, or the fact that the Harlem Renaissance “brought together a dizzying array of writers”.

That’s not to say there’s no meat.  He has an excellent point about city poverty: that it should be accounted a sign of success rather than failure; it’s better than rural poverty, and that a city attracts the poor means that it’s offering opportunities to move up.  He also has some good reflections on how First World cities overcame their 19th century problems– corruption and poor health, and how telecommunications paradoxically enhances the value of face-to-face interaction.

Glaeser is a conservative, which mostly comes out in some snark about government boondoggles and an unargued confidence in schools vouchers.  But for that very reason, I’d recommend the book to my conservative readers, if I still have any.  Conservatives could stand to hear one of their own explaining that cities are hotbeds of entrepreneurship and innovation, that they prosper when there’s heavy investment in education, that high-density development is good for people and for the environment, that immigration benefits the host country, that the government should stop supporting sprawl.  Just try to skip the anecdotes about shoes.

The aptly named blog Overthinking It considers whether it made any sense for the Empire to blow up Alderaan.  Isn’t destroying your own territory kind of a loser move, and likely to induce rather than prevent rebellion?

Some good points are made in the Empire’s defense:

  • State terror is a traditional tactic.  Savage enough reprisals will definitely make people think.  There’s an ongoing test right now in Syria: will Bashar Assad’s invasion of his own city of Daraa tamp down dissent?
  • Game theory suggests that acting batshit insane offers an edge in further negotiations.  Again, there’s an ongoing test: the Republican Party.  It sure worked for them in 2010. 

I’m more convinced, however, by the analysis of a dude named Fenzel, who suggests that the Death Star was a cost-cutting measure… a misguided one.  To really control the galaxy you need a galaxywide bureaucracy, and it has to be reasonably effective: Soviet level, not Somalia level.  Sheer destruction does not solve any problems, does not create any allies, and ultimately saves no money, as your empire will fall apart.  (As it does in the film: the Death Star strategy leaves the Emperor dead and rebellion breaking out in his capital.)

On the second page, the analysis is mooted (based on references to a Trade Federation in the prequels, which Palpatine is assumed to have co-opted) that the Star Wars galaxy, despite its high tech, barely has a capitalist economy at all.  So far as we can see it has a mercantilist economy: commerce is controlled by semi-official agencies; we don’t really see corporations or really any middle-class economic activity, only state actors, crime lords, bounty hunters, and smugglers.  So there is not really a private sector that might care about Alderaan, only the central state, for whom anything that is not a puppet is an enemy.

Given that the larger Star Wars canon shows the Sith always showing up, every generation or so, the real question is how any sort of prosperity develops at all.  States that rely entirely on terror, like Tamerlane’s, don’t last long and simply destroy productive resources.  Arguably the Empire only looks good because it’s a projection of the mid-20C threat of the Nazis and Soviets, which at certain times and in certain lights made democratic capitalism look endangered.  But it was all an illusion.  The Nazis just stimulated their economy before the West dared to, and the Soviets just had an industrial revolution, something you only get once.  Neither had any secret more effective economic powers.

In general, fantasy evil empires make no economic sense over the long run, except in the shallow sense that they might simply control more territory than their enemies.  That’s one reason I put a lot of thought into how ktuvok empires might work.  The ktuvoks run the empire for their own benefit, but they can’t even accomplish their own purposes without guaranteeing a certain level of comfort and security for their human subjects.  Once foreign technology really gets going, they even have to come up with some form of power-sharing– they may retain the upper claw, but they can’t simply rely on state terror to accomplish anything.

The top 1 percent have the best houses, the best educations, the best doctors, and the best lifestyles, but there is one thing that money doesn’t seem to have bought: an understanding that their fate is bound up with how the other 99 percent live. Throughout history, this is something that the top 1 percent eventually do learn. Too late.

A nice post from Joseph Stiglitz on the dominance of our society by the top 1%, and why it sucks for the rest of us.

The Ryan Ripoff, as Yglesias calls it, is just one example.  The rich now feel secure enough they can openly call for the pauperization of the elderly in order to pay even less taxes.

(As others have pointed out, it’s not even the rich in general who are the worst problem.  It’s the financial industry in particular.  That’s where you get the obscene CEO salaries, the insistence on the privatization of profit and the socialization of loss, and the inability to improve the greater society.  Finance these days doesn’t benefit anyone but finance.)

One of the themes in my sf timeline is the rise of Brazil.  And now it can be said to be happening.  Here’s a great article by Perry Anderson on the rising power and prosperity of Brazil, largely the achievement of its previous president, Luiz Inácio da Silva (Lula).  It was a bit of luck (e.g. rising commodity prices and being a key market for China), a good lump of sense, and above all some refreshingly left-wing measures.  The number of poor in Brazil dropped from 50 to 30 million in six years.  And his reaction to the recession was startlingly Keynesian… he continued spending and encourged Brazilians to do the same; growth resumed in just a few months.

The upper class hates him, for much the same reason as their equivalents hated Roosevelt: not because their interests are harmed (the Brazilian stock market is booming, and more prosperity means more sales) but because their self-image is.  They can’t forgive someone whose power doesn’t depend on them.

Matt Yglesias had a neat insight which I think I’ll steal for the Incatena: people in the future won’t all have “futuristic jobs”.

But a lot of what’s going to happen is that we’ll just have more employment in already-extant banal fields that’s just aren’t amenable to being done by Chinese people or robots. After all “the future” in this sense is a richer world. Right now, some people work as personal trainers. If people were richer, more people would hire personal trainers, and your personal trainer can’t live in Shenzhen so this is one of “the jobs of the future.”

Of course, if people are richer in general these will be reasonably paid jobs.  It’s not as exotic as spaceship pilot or nanotech engineer, but I think his logic is right.

Neal Stephenson has a great article at Slate on rockets, which achieves the rather Chestertonian goal of making something familiar look strange and unlikely.  Basically, a series of improbable steps led us to adopt a fantastically expensive and challenging technology, which we’re now locked into for mysterious reasons.

(tl; dr summary: Rockets are so expensive and hard to control that they’re near-useless militarily; but the invention of atomic bombs and the existence of a long-range enemy made us invest a few trillion dollars in them; and that in turn allowed us to build profitable communications satellites— so long as they could be built to be about the size of a bomb.)

There’s a great article in the New York Times, by Tina Rosenberg, on anti-poverty programs in Brazil and Mexico that really work.

Today, however, Brazil’s level of economic inequality is dropping at a faster rate than that of almost any other country.  Between 2003 and 2009, the income of poor Brazilians has grown seven times as much as the income of rich Brazilians.  Poverty has fallen during that time from 22 percent of the population to 7 percent.  Here’s the basics:

The program, called Bolsa Familia (Family Grant) in Brazil, goes by different names in different places. In Mexico, where it first began on a national scale and has been equally successful at reducing poverty, it is Oportunidades. The generic term for the program is conditional cash transfers.  The idea is to give regular payments to poor families, in the form of cash or electronic transfers into their bank accounts, if they meet certain requirements.  The requirements vary, but many countries employ those used by Mexico: families must keep their children in school and go for regular medical checkups, and mom must attend workshops on subjects like nutrition or disease prevention.  The payments almost always go to women, as they are the most likely to spend the money on their families.  The elegant idea behind conditional cash transfers is to combat poverty today while breaking the cycle of poverty for tomorrow.

It’s refreshing to have any good news at all in this area; usually all that can be offered is the hope that general prosperity will trickle down sometime, and as Amy Chua points out, in many areas this just doesn’t happen.  Not only do the Brazilian and Mexican programs measurably help, but they’re large-scale national programs.  It’s relatively easy to make a difference in one town somewhere; the usual problem is scaling the solution up.

I picked up Amy Chua’s World On Fire almost by accident.  It’s amazing and really alarming.

Explosive mixture

Her basic thesis is that the combination of market-dominant minorities and democracy is a powder keg.  These are protoypically ethnic minorities that entirely dominate a nation’s economy.  E.g. her own people, the Chinese of the Philippines, form 1% of the population but control 60% of the private economy, including its four airlines and most of its banks, hotels, shopping malls, and major corporations.  Other examples include the Indians in East Africa, the whites in South Africa and Latin America, Eritreans in Ethiopia, Croatians in Serbia, the Tutsi in Rwanda, and the Lebanese and Ibo in West Africa.

The problem is, economic liberalization– that is, the IMF’s favorite recipe of free markets, privatization, ease of access for foreign capital, and austerity programs for eveyone else– makes the economy grow, but if there’s a market-dominant minority the benefits flow almost entirely to them, leaving the majority living in slums with open sewers.

Now throw in democracy, meaning universal elections.  Our notion is that elections somehow prevent the excesses of dictatorship and war.  But when there’s a market-dominant minority it’s highly resented, and demagogues will arise to target them.  If they get power the likely result is either a backlash against the market (a wave of nationalization, looting, and/or genocide), or a backlash against democracy (the elite takes over, repressing the majority).

Chua points out that Americans are exporting a fanciful version of our system which we never had to live under ourselves: laissez-faire capitalism without a social net or redistributive agencies, plus universal suffrage without strong court systems and protections for minorities.  (Most Western countries never had a market-dominant minority, and also didn’t empower the masses till quite a bit had trickled down to them.)  As in Iraq, we expect that these things will do magic, and never seem to learn what an explosive combination is produced by minority economic power plus majority political power.

She also notes that the Asian Tigers were mostly exceptions to the pattern of market-dominant minorities: Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and now China and to a large extent India.  

She talks about colonialism, which of course was an instance of her thesis: Europeans were a market-dominant minority worldwide.  In some cases present-day dominant minorities were groups favored by the colonial powers in a divide-and-conquer strategy (e.g. the Kikuyu in Kenya)… effective at the time, a disaster in the long term.  I’d even suggest that the cultural matrix of colonialism– the passivity encouraged in the masses– may be part of why we see this pattern in most of the world.  It may be significant that those same Asian Tigers were either never colonized or colonized for only short periods.

Edge cases

Chua examines a few edge cases, with a little less felicity.  For instance, six out of the seven oligarchs who emerged in Yeltsin’s Russia are Jewish.  This has certainly fueled a new buildup of anti-Semitism, but it certainly can’t be said that Jews dominate the economy, and (as she acknowledges) anti-Semitism has a long troubled history that doesn’t simply derive from market dominance. 

Sections on Arab resentment of Israel, and the world in general’s resentment of America, also feel like stretching the thesis.

You can also have market-dominant minorities without democracy, and by her own account these can be explosive too.  It’s true that an ethnic or racial minority can dominate for centuries, as in Latin America, and that a dictatorship can damp down ethnic tensions, as in Yugoslavia or Marcos’s Philippines.  But a dictatorshp can also seize on ethnic resentment as a very effective prop to its own power– e.g. Idi Amin’s attacks on Indians in Uganda.  And it’s kind of a devil’s bargain when a minority partners with a majority ruler, as the Chinese in the Philippines did with Marcos.  This may only postpone the reckoning, and the dictator’s bite is likely to be enormous– e.g. the Marcoses demanded a free 25% stake in every corporation.  The Russian oligarchs helped put Yelstin and then Putin in power, but Putin has moved against two of them and made it clear that no dissent is allowed.

It’s not just democracy that’s made it harder to keep the lid on; global media shines a light on inequalities that used to be hidden, and globalization favors well-connected minorities– e.g. the Lebanese in West Africa and the Chinese in Southeast Asia can call on investment from back home.  And of course modern insurgencies make it easier than ever for an aggrieved minority to take its revenge.

What to do?

First, of course, we should be aware of the problem and stop insisting on simultaneous laissez-faire capitalism plus universal elections.  You can’t have both.

She suggests mitigating both halves.  More social net, more means to redistribute wealth to the majority, maybe a slower transition to democracy.  (She notes that China hasn’t simply remained as a communist despotism; the old Maoists have been retired, local elections have been held, and the national congress is beginning to function as a place for real debate.)  Dominant minorities could also make more of an effort towards helping the majority themselves; she notes with approval that one of the Russian tycoons, Roman Abramovich, has turned himself into a philanthropist, governing a remote Siberian province with largesse funded from his own coffers.  It’s working so far; he’s very popular, unlike the other oligarchs.

She also notes that where there’s less resentment of dominant minorities, it’s often because of some fairly drastic assimilation or affirmative action campaigns– e.g Thailand had some anti-Chinese measures in the last century, and Malaysia has done a lot to give Malays access to the professions and big business.  Redistribution doesn’t have to be total to allay resentment.

Chua carefully remains within a democratic capitalist worldview; she assumes that socialism doesn’t work.  I think a more leftward stance would help here.  She’s right that simple expropriation is usually catastrophic– e.g. Mugabe’s confiscation of white-owned farms, which hasn’t redistributed their huge import income to his landless followers, but simply destroyed it.  But I think she assumes too readily that the IMF consensus actually produces prosperity, though badly distributed.  Latin American and African economies, for instance, did significantly worse under neoliberalism. 

It’s also striking that the program preached to the Third World by the Very Serious Global People– free trade, no local control over currency, privatization, no tariffs, no unions, no regulation, austerity for the poor when the inevitable recession hits– is essentially their fantasy for the US and Europe as well.  They rail against precisely those aspects of liberal capitalism that protect us from populist– or communist– resentment and revenge.  Chua is pretty strong in her warnings, but I think she could be stronger: laissez-faire is a fantasy; you just can’t have your Randite utopia where the masses cheerfully accept their inequality forever.  You can stay rich by adopting liberalism, or you can throw the dice and either maintain power by brute force or lose it to revolution.

As Chua points out, the US economy as a whole has no market-dominant minority, but historically a part of it did: the white plantation owners of the South.  And when they lost the Civil War they were terrified of democracy, which they assumed would turn into destructive vengeance by the black majority.  They took the anti-democratic approach, and though this in turn was defeated, it’s affected our politics ever since.  Fear of the poor, and the use of assumed cultural values to divide up the poor into clashing groups that can’t unite against the elite, are aspects of classic Southern politics that have been generalized nationally…. though they tend not to work so well in the blue states. 

Ironically, this is one of the reasons we’re exporting such a foolish combination to the rest of the world: our elites hate redistributive programs, but also have no experience of subjugation to market-dominant minorities.  So they just have no idea of what’ll happen.

Income inequality is one of the great unsolved problems of our time.  Liberalism does work; the US’s decades of greatest prosperity were also the time when we had the most aggressive redistributive policies in place.  But we haven’t figured out how to prevent the backlash from the elite.  And new technologies plus non-sustainable energy are only going to exacerbate the problem in this century.

Could you help unpack the claim that New Deal programs extended the Great Depression? Naturally, it’s something that keeps coming up in debate when discussing the extension of government programs, especially in the current climate, but what exactly the argument is isn’t something I’ve truly understood. On the one hand, I’d be more than willing to believe it as partisan rewriting of history, but the same people making the claim seem to credit World War II for ending the depression, which, let’s face it, was the biggest public works project in history (though, admittedly, it isn’t usually characterized as such).  Is there any real basis here? If so, what are the lessons we need to learn? If not, what is the best way to argue against such claims?

—Patrick Augustine

Your instincts are right— the New Deal is a huge problem for libertarians, and popular besides, so they have to engage in a good deal of revisionism to discredit it. 

The general response is just to look at what happened.  Here’s a graph of inflation-adjusted GDP in the Depression/WWII years:

 

Under Hoover, no new Deal: declining GDP.  Under Roosevelt and the New Deal: GDP recovers, nearly doubling in the pre-war years. 

You may well ask, what the hell happened in 1938?  Roosevelt started listening to deficit hawks, that’s what.  The New Deal wasn’t a technocratic marvel; it was a furious improvisation, and Roosevelt’s style was to try ten things at once in case some of them worked; and he was never entirely happy with long-term deficit spending.  Remember his metaphor, pump-priming; the idea was to jump-start the economy and then step back.  So he did.  This is clearer in the following graph, of government expenditures in the Depression years:

Stopping the stimulus early sent the economy back into a recession (with a lag), and was cured by restoring spending.

The New Deal stimulus was working, but you’re quite right that what really ended the Depression was WWII spending.  Many people seem to react to this as if it the war suddenly removed the discussion from economics: oh, you know, that was a war.  It sure was; it was also, as you say, an enormous public works project.   It was so huge that I  had to remove the war years from the above graph: expenditures were eight times higher, so the 1937 blip gets washed out.  Let me underline that: the war worked better as stimulus because it was eight times larger.

And as government spending, a war mainly involves throwing money into economically useless things: bombs, guns, tanks, aircraft carriers.  Imagine spending all that money on useful investments instead.

For more, some of Krugmans’s columns are relevant.  (Or just search for “Depression” on his blog.)

The fourth link in particular gives more detail on the source of the “New Deal was bad” revisionism.

Also good, this post by Eric Rauchway: http://edgeofthewest.wordpress.com/2008/11/07/when-is-it-lying/

Many on the left are appalled by Obama’s deal on taxes, but it has at least this going for it: it pissed off Charles Krauthammer.

His main complaints:

  • It actually comprises a $990 billion stimulus to the economy.
  • It will add 1% to GDP.
  • It will lower unemployment by 1.5%.

Yes, those are complaints.  He is whining that we’re trying to grow the economy in a recession, and terrified that it will work.  Why does he want the economy to stay stagnant and millions to stay out of work?  Because he wants Obama to lose in 2012, of course.

He thinks the Republicans got snookered into abandoning their “newfound, second-chance, post-Bush, Tea-Party, this-time-we’re-serious persona of debt-averse fiscal responsibility”.  This a couple paragraphs down from noting that two thirds of the stimulus is the extension of the Bush tax cuts, the Holy Grail of the GOP.  That is, if there were no Obama, these “post-Bush, Tea-Party” Republicans would have been adding 2/3 of a trillion dollars to the debt in just two years.

Krauthammer isn’t stupid; how can he possibly believe that the party which loudly insisted on a deficit-mushrooming tax cut plan had the slightest actual interest in reducing the debt?

But I’m afraid he’s mostly worked up over nothing.  It isn’t a trillion-dollar stimulus, for the very reason that 2/3 of it has been in effect for years.  Bush’s giveaway to the rich and his destruction of Clinton’s surpluses didn’t produce prosperity; they helped give us a jobless recovery and then the biggest recession since the Great Depression, featuring the collapse of two major U.S. industries.

(For that matter, it’s beginning to look like winning the 2012 election will be a poison pill.  The Republicans will prevent anything that actually helps the economy, and if they win they’ll do nothing but balloon the deficit more and maybe start another war.)

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